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Information is invoked by biologists in numerous contexts.  Animal
behaviorists examine the signaling between two organisms or attempt to delimit
the structure of the internal map that guides an organism’s migration.
Neurobiologists refer to the information passed along neurons and across
synapses in brains and nervous systems.  The way in which information
terminology is used in these contexts is not the main critical focus of
philosophers. Philosophers of mind discuss animals’ representation systems,
such as bees’ internal maps, and also focus on the way in which brains operate
with a view to shedding light on traditional problems in the philosophy of mind.
In contrast, the focus of much heated discussion in philosophy of biology is the
notion of information invoked in explaining heredity and development: genetic
information.  The focus in this article will be on this latter form of biological
information.
The ideas that genes are bearers of information or contain programs that
guide organisms’ development are pervasive ones.  These ideas are adhered to
explicitly and implicitly by biologists and popularizers of biology.  The ideas are
so pervasive in biology they may seem hardly worth examining or questioning.
Consulting any biology textbook will reveal that genes contain information in the
form of DNA sequences and that this information provides instructions for the
production of phenotypes.  In contrast, an examination of the philosophical
2literature on genetic information reveals that there are very few philosophers of
biology who promote unqualified versions of either of these ideas.  To
understand how this situation has arisen requires first looking at the role
informational concepts play in biology.  To do this some concepts in molecular
biology are briefly introduced and a brief history of the use of information
concepts in biology illustrates their pervasiveness.  Second, important aspects of
the philosophical discussion of information concepts in biology is presented.
1.  A Brief Look at some of the Relevant Biology.
Biologists are interested in two important processes: evolution and
development.  Evolutionary biologists attempt to account for the process of
evolutionary change, including speciation and changes to organisms through
time within a species.  There was much progress in conceptualizing evolutionary
change when it was characterized in terms of changing gene frequencies in the
1930’s and 1940’s.  Many evolutionary biologists discuss evolution entirely from
a genetic perspective.  After genes were established as the relevant heritable
material the next step was to conceptualize the relevant heritable material in
terms of molecular structure.  In 1953 the structure of DNA was discovered and
with this discovery came a mechanism for accounting for the duplication of
heritable material and its transmission from one generation to the next.  What the
discovery of the structure of DNA also ushered in was a research focus for the
developing field of molecular biology.  An important part of this field is directed
at uncovering aspects of organisms’ development.
Developmental biology is the study of the development of organisms
3from fertilized egg to adulthood.  Thought in developmental biology has often
diverged from thought in evolutionary biology.  Developmental biologists have
periodically challenged views and approaches in evolutionary biology, including
evolutionary biologists’ focus on the gene.  With the new techniques in molecular
biology came the hope for a unified approach to evolution and development.  On
this approach, molecular evolutionary biology and molecular developmental
biology would work consistently side by side.  Evolution includes the passing on
of genetic material form one generation to the next  and development is the
process moving from genetic material to somatic material.  These processes can
be understood from a molecular perspective if the component of heredity in
evolution is understood to be the passing on of DNA from one generation to the
next and development to be the production of proteins from DNA.  In this
picture, genes are discrete strands of DNA that are passed faithfully from one
generation to the next and each gene is responsible for the production of a
particular protein or polypeptide.  This is a definition of the gene that reflects the
story of the union of developmental and evolutionary biology via molecular
biology.
Understanding more about the nature of DNA and RNA reveals a role
that a concept of information can play in understanding heredity and
development.  The bases in DNA and RNA can be helpfully construed as letters
in an alphabet and the relation between the triplets of letters in the RNA and the
resulting polypeptide chain can be construed as a coding relation.  So, the DNA
contains the code for the polypeptide.  Rather than causing the production of the
relevant protein, the DNA sequence contains the code for it.
4The definition of the gene introduced above can now be reconsidered.
Rather than genes being discrete strands of DNA passed on from one generation
to the next, genes can now be characterized as containing information that is
passed on from one generation to the next and that information is the code for a
particular protein or polypeptide.   What is relevantly passed on from one
generation to the next is the information in the DNA, encoded in the unique
sequence of bases.  Development can now  be conceptualized as the faithful
transmission of information from DNA to RNA, via the complementary base
patterns, and then the passing on of that information into the linear structure of
the protein, via the coding relation between triplets of base pairs and specific
amino acids.  Molecular biologists have introduced terminology that is consistent
with this approach: the information in DNA is replicated in cell division,
“transcribed” from DNA to RNA and “translated” from RNA to proteins.
Although the process of development includes every part of the life cycle
of any particular organism leading to the whole collection of the organism’s
phenotypic traits, the discussion that follows focuses on the part of the
developmental process operating within cells that starts with the separation of
DNA strands and concludes with the production of a protein.  In some
discussions, genetic information is presented as containing instructions for the
production for phenotypic traits such as eyes but these extensions of the concept
present many additional problems to those reviewed below (Godfrey-Smith
2000).
52.  The Pervasive Information Gene Concept: History and Current Practice.
In his provocative What Is Life, of 1944, the physicist Erwin Shrodinger
said “these chromosomes … contain in some kind of code-script the entire
pattern of the individual’s future development and of its functioning in the
mature state” (Schrodinger 1944, 20).  He went on to explain his terminology: “In
calling the structure of the chromosome fibers a code-script we mean that the all-
penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to which every causal connection
lay immediately open, could tell from their structure whether the egg would
develop, under suitable conditions, into a black cock or into a speckled hen, into
a fly or a maize plant, a rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman”
(Schrodinger 1944, 20-21).  As Morange puts it, Shrodinger saw “genes merely as
containers of information, as a code that determines the formation of the
individual” (Morange 1998, 75).  Shrodinger’s proposals were made before the
discovery of the structure of DNA.  What is important that Shrodinger’s words
were read by many of those who were instrumental in the development of
molecular biology.
As Sarkar (1996) points out, Watson and Crick are the first to use the term
“information” in the context of discussions of the genetic code: “The phosphate-
sugar backbone of our model is completely regular, but any sequence of the pairs
of bases can fit into the structure.  It follows that in a long molecule many
different permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likely that the precise
sequence of the bases is the code which carries the genetical information”
(Watson and Crick 1980/1953, 244).  The French geneticists Jacob and Monod
6also played roles in sustaining Shrodinger’s language of the code helping to
reinforce the use of information language in molecular biology (Fox Keller 2000).
By the early 1960’s this terminology was established in the new field of molecular
biology.
The information gene concept is pervasive in the work of theoretical
evolutionary biologists.  Perhaps the most influential formulation of the concept
of heredity in terms of information was that of the evolutionary theorist George
Williams.  In his widely read Adaptation and Natural Selection [, 1966 #22] he
says: “In evolutionary theory, a gene could be defined as any hereditary
information for which there is a favorable or unfavorable selection bias equal to
several or many times the rate of endogenous change” (Williams 1966, 25).  And
later: “A gene is not a DNA molecule; it is the transcribable information coded by
the molecule” (Williams 1992, 11).
Defining the gene in terms of information or as a code is also the standard
usage in biology text books.  One of the standard molecular biology texts
introduces the topic as follows: "Today the idea that DNA carries genetic
information in its long chain of nucleotides is so fundamental to biological
thought that it is sometimes difficult to realize the enormous intellectual gap it
filled" (Alberts and al. 1994, 98).  One of the definitions of the gene in the same
text is: "a gene [is] any DNA sequence that is transcribed as a single unit and
encodes one set of closely related polypeptide chains (protein isoforms)" (ibid.,
457).  Textbook introductions to molecular biology are filled with the
7terminology of transcription, translation and coding, terminology that implies
the transfer of information.
It should now be clear that information terminology is pervasive in
biology and also at least somewhat clear why this is the case.  There were some
historical reasons for adopting the terminology and there is some utility to the
informational concepts.  There are however some problems associated with
construing genes informationally.  Many of these problems have been introduced
by philosophers of biology but there has also been much discussion of the
information gene concept in biology.  There have even been productive
discussions between philosophers and biologists, a rare situation in philosophy
of science but a highly desirable one.
3.  Problems for the Information Gene Concept.
In several of his recent writings evolutionary biologist Maynard Smith has
invited philosophers to join the discussion about the informational gene concept.
For example, he says that "given the role that ideas drawn from a study of
human communication have played, and continue to play, in biology it is strange
that so little attention has been paid to them by philosophers of biology.  I think
that it is a topic that would reward serious study" (Maynard Smith 2000a, 192).
While not addressing the concept of genetic information directly, philosophers of
biology have been attending to these issues indirectly for some time in working
on central problems in philosophy of biology.  For example, the notion of genes
as information has played an important role in discussions of reductionism, units
of selection, the replicator/interactor distinction, gene/ environment interaction,
8nativism, and the developmental systems theorists’ program.  Recently,
philosophers' focus has turned more explicitly to the informational gene concept.
Several philosophers are now engaged in the project of developing a general
notion of information that fits best with biologists’ aims when they invoke
genetic information.
The informational definition of the gene introduced above in Section 1.
says that genes contain information that is passed on from one generation to the
next and that information codes for a particular protein or polypeptide.  As
Sterelny and Griffiths put it: "The classical molecular gene concept is a stretch of
DNA that codes for a single polypeptide chain" (1999, 132).  Genes, on this view,
contain information about the phenotype, the protein that is expressed.  While
most biologists believe that genes contain information about the relevant
phenotype, none believe that the information in the genes is sufficient to produce
the relevant phenotypes.  Even those most routinely chastised for being genetic
determinists understand that the information in the gene is only expressed with
the aid of a whole host of cellular machinery.  As a result the standard view is
that genes contain the relevant or important information guiding the
development of the organism.  All other cellular machinery merely assists in the
expression of the information.  One way to put this idea is that genes introduce
information to the developmental process while all other mechanisms make
merely a causal contribution to development.
One move that philosophers (and some biologists) have made is to
characterize the process of passing on the information in the gene by using terms
9from information theory.  Information theory holds that “an event carries
information about another event to the extent that it is causally related to it in a
systematic fashion.  Information is thus said to be conveyed over a “channel”
connecting the “sender” [or “signal”] with the “receiver” when a change in the
receiver is causally related to a change in the sender” (Gray 2001, 190).  On this
view information is reduced to causal covariance or systematic causal
dependence.  Philosophers of biology refer to this characterization of genetic
information as the “causal” view.   Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) illustrate how
the causal information concept could work in the context of molecular biology:
“The idea of information as systematic causal dependence can be used to explain
how genes convey developmental information.  The genome is the signal and the
rest of the developmental matrix provides channel conditions under which the
life cycle of the organism contains (receives) information about the genome”
(Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, p.102).
Several have argued that the causal view suffers from serious problems.
Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) point out that “it is a fundamental fact of
information theory that the role of signal source and channel condition can be
reversed” (p. 102) as the signal/channel distinction is simply a matter of causal
covariance.  Further, the signal/channel distinction is a function of observers’
interests.  For example, we could choose to hold the developmental history of an
organism constant and from this perspective the organism’s phenotype would
carry information about their genotype.  But if we choose to “hold all
developmental factors other than (say) nutrient quantity constant, the amount of
nutrition available to  the organism will covary with, and hence also carry
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information about its phenotype” (p. 102). The causal information concept is
lacking, because it cannot distinguish the genes as the singular bearers of
important or relevant information.  Rather, on this view, genes are just one
source of information; aspects of the organism’s environment and cellular
material also contain information.  This position is called the “parity thesis”
(Griffiths and Gray 1994).  The parity thesis exposes the need for another
information concept that elevates genes alone to the status of information
bearers.
Alternative concepts of information have been examined in attempts to
respond to this situation; one is referred to variously as intentional, semantic or
teleosemantic information (the term “teleosemantic” is used in what follows).
This notion of information has been defended most forcefully recently by
Maynard Smith but versions of it are defended by philosophers including Daniel
Dennett (Dennett 1995) and Kim Sterelny (Sterelny, Smith et al. 1996; Sterelny
2000).  The term “teleosemantics” is borrowed from “the philosophical program
of reducing meaning to biological function (teleology) and then reducing
biological function to” natural selection.  Ruth Millikan and Karen Neander are
proponents of this program (A good survey of relations between philosophy of
mind and genetic information concepts is provided in Godfrey-Smith 1999).  This
view is articulated in the philosophy of mind as the thesis that a mental state
token, such as a sentence, has the biological function of representing a particular
state of the world and that function arose as result of selection.
Applying this view to the current problem results in the following: “a
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gene contains information about the developmental outcomes that it was
selected to produce” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 105).  Maynard Smith puts the
view as follows: "DNA contains information that has been programmed by
natural selection" (Maynard Smith 2000a, 190).  Here the information in the gene
is analogous to a sentence in the head.  The gene contains information not just as
a result of relevantly causally co-varying with the phenotype, but as a result of
having the function of producing the relevant phenotype.  Defenders of this
view, claim that this allows for the information to stay the same even if the
channel conditions change; if the channel conditions change, the information in
the gene has simply been misinterpreted.  This concept could solve the problem
of rendering the genes the sole information bearers, as “if other developmental
causes do not contain [teleosemantic] information and genes do, then genes do
indeed play a unique role in development” (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 104).
Although the teleosemantic view shows promise, the debate has not
ended here.  The teleosemantic view opens up a possibility: if a developmental
cause, part of the cellular machinery for example, is found to be heritable and
performs the function of producing a particular developmental outcome, then by
definition, it also contains teleosemantic information.  Many, including Sarkar
(1996; 2000), Griffiths (1994), Gray (2001), Fox Keller (Fox Keller 2000), Sterelny
(1996; 2000), have argued that indeed there are such mechanisms.  These authors
draw various conclusions from the demonstrated presence of mechanisms that
are not genes, are heritable and perform the function of producing a specific
developmental outcome.  Developmental systems theorists such as Giffiths and
Gray take these findings to show that teleosemantic information succumbs to the
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parity thesis also.  They go on to argue that no concept of information will
distinguish genes as a special contributor to development.  Genes are just fellow
travelers alongside cellular machinery and the environment in shaping
developmental outcomes.  Others such as Sarkar and Fox Keller are more
cautious and hold out for a concept of information that can distinguish genes as a
distinct kind of information bearer.  On the other side, Maynard Smith and
others have attempted to refine the notion of teleosemantic information to
preserve a biological distinction that seems to be important: "The most
fundamental distinction in biology is between nucleic acids, with their role as
carriers of information, and proteins, which generate the phenotype"  (Maynard
Smith and Szathmary 1995, 61).
Three coherent options present themselves to answer the question “where
is biological information found?”:
1.  Information is present in DNA and other nucleotide sequences.  Other cellular
mechanisms contain no information.
2.  Information is present in DNA, other nucleotide sequences and other cellular
mechanisms, for example cytoplasmic or extra-cellular proteins; and in many
other media, for example, the embryonic environment or components of an
organism’s wider environment.
3. DNA and other nucleotide sequences do not contain information, nor do any
other cellular mechanisms.
These options can be read either ontologically or heuristically (An
introduction to heuristics is provided by Richardson 1999).  The ontological
reading of 1. is that there is a certain kind of information that is only present in
DNA and other nucleotide sequences.  As a result any workable concept of
information is constrained.  The concept adopted cannot be consistent with
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information of the relevant sort existing in any other media that are causally
responsible for an organism’s development.  The heuristic reading of 1. is that
viewing information as present in DNA and other nucleotides is the most reliable
guide to good answers in research in developmental molecular biology.  The
philosophical discussion presented above focuses on developing or challenging
accounts of information that are consistent with an ontological reading of 1..  For
example, Maynard Smith, and others such as Dennett, are defenders of a version
of 1..  Many assume that 2. only makes sense ontologically if one adopts a causal
information concept but some of the discussion already referred to indicates that
other developmentally relevant media can be construed as containing
teleosemantic information.  Defenders of the developmental systems theory
approach hold a version of 2. as does Sarkar (Sarkar 1996).  To my knowledge
only one philosopher, Ken Waters (Waters 2000), has provided a sustained
defense of option 3.. Maynard Smith argues that to construe all processes of
development in causal terms without recourse to the concept of genetic
information is to relegate them to the hopelessly complex and implicitly to argue
that no systematic explanations will be forthcoming (See e.g. Maynard Smith
1998, 5-6).  Waters begs to differ, arguing that information talk in biology is
misleading and can all be coherently be substituted for by causal talk.  Waters
also believes that it is most practicing biologists’ intent to provide a causal
account of development rather than one that invokes information.
This overview reveals that philosophers are actively cooperating with
theoretical biologists to develop fruitful concepts of information that help us
make sense of the information terminology widely used in biology.  These
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discussions are still inconclusive and as a result this is a potentially productive
area for future philosophical work.
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